POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)
S. MERRICK · 2026 · Case ID: A26036568
Summary
The Veteran, who served in the U.S. Army from December 1971 to December 1973, appeals the denial of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD. The Veteran claims the condition is related to a 1972 incident at Spandau Prison in Berlin, Germany, where he reported experiencing paranormal phenomena. The Board recharacterized the claim as one for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD. To establish service connection for PTSD, the Board requires a medical diagnosis, credible evidence of the in-service stressor, and a medical link between current symptoms and the stressor. The Veteran's service treatment records and separation examination were silent regarding psychiatric issues. Post-service records from 2015 showed negative mental health screenings and denial of prior psychiatric care. The first mention of mental health complaints occurred in March 2019, with a PTSD diagnosis in May 2019, attributed to combat, though the records do not support combat service. A January 2021 VA examination diagnosed bereavement, not PTSD, finding the Veteran's symptoms did not meet DSM-5 criteria and that there was no objective evidence of a Criterion A stressor. The examiner opined that the Veteran does not have PTSD and that his current bereavement diagnosis is not service-connected. The Board found this VA opinion highly probative, noting it was supported by the record and medical principles, and was not contradicted by other evidence. Lay statements from a friend, sister, and former significant other were considered but deemed not competent to diagnose or establish etiology. The Veteran's own testimony was considered competent for symptoms but not for diagnosis or etiology. The Board found the claimed stressor uncorroborated, the service records silent, and post-service records showed negative screenings until 2019. No medical opinion linked the current condition to service. The benefit of the doubt doctrine was considered but found inapplicable as the evidence was not in approximate balance. Service connection for the acquired psychiatric disorder was denied.
Rationale
Service treatment records silent regarding mental health issues.; Post-service records showed negative mental health screenings until 2019.; VA examination diagnosed bereavement, not PTSD, and opined condition was less likely than not related to service.
Full Decision Text
Citation Nr: A26036568 Decision Date: 04/20/26 Archive Date: 04/20/26 DOCKET NO. 210327-149068 DATE: April 20, 2026 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is denied. FINDING OF FACT The weight of the evidence is against finding that PTSD has been diagnosed based on a verified in-service stressor or that an acquired psychiatric disorder was incurred in service or is otherwise related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1113, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from December 1971 to December 1973. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2021 rating decision by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In the March 2021 VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal (Notice of Disagreement), the Veteran elected the Hearing docket. A Board hearing was held on January 21, 2025. Therefore, the Board may only consider the evidence of record at the time of the February 2021 rating decision on appeal, as well as any evidence submitted by the Veteran [or representative] at the hearing or within 90 days following the hearing. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(a). If evidence was submitted either (1) during the period after the RO issued the decision on appeal and prior to the Board hearing, or (2) more than 90 days following the hearing, the Board did not consider it in its decision. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.300, 20.302(a), 20.801. If the Veteran would like VA to consider any evidence that was submitted that the Board could not consider, the Veteran may file a Supplemental Claim (VA Form 20-0995) and submit or identify this evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2501. If the evidence is new and relevant, VA will issue another decision on the claim[s], considering the new evidence in addition to the evidence previously considered. Id. Specific instructions for filing a Supplemental Claim are included with this decision. Generally, when a Veteran makes a claim for PTSD, he is seeking service connection for symptoms regardless of how those symptoms are diagnosed or labeled. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Therefore, the Board has recharacterized the issue into a claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran's representative filed a brief in April 2025 requesting that the Veterans Law Judge who presided over the hearing not participate in the decision in this case. See April 2025 Appellate Brief (VSO IHP; Post remand Brief; Attorney Brief). The Board is not ruling on the motion. Rather, the appeal will be decided by the undersigned who did not conduct the hearing. See Frantzis v. McDonough, 104 F.4th 262 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Service Connection Service connection may be granted for current disability arising from disease or injury incurred or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1131. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Generally, establishing service connection requires competent evidence of three things: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship, i.e., a nexus, between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). There are regulations specific to PTSD claims, which impose additional evidentiary requirements. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) a medical diagnosis of PTSD utilizing, in this case, the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) criteria, in accordance with 38 C ) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship, i.e., a nexus, between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). There are regulations specific to PTSD claims, which impose additional evidentiary requirements. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) a medical diagnosis of PTSD utilizing, in this case, the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) criteria, in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). When there is a current diagnosis of PTSD, the sufficiency of a claimed in-service stressor is presumed. Cohen at 144. Nevertheless, credible evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred is still required. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Credible supporting evidence cannot consist solely of after-the-fact medical evidence containing an opinion as to a causal relationship between PTSD and service. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 396 (1996). VA is required to give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim for disability benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a). Lay testimony is competent to prove that a claimant exhibited certain lay-observable symptoms and the time those symptoms appeared. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). Lay assertions may serve to support a claim for service connection by establishing the occurrence of observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability that are subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In determining whether service connection is warranted, the Board shall consider the benefit of the doubt doctrine. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. A Veteran is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when evidence is in approximate balance. 38 U.S.C. § 5107. The benefit of the doubt rule does not require that the evidence be in exact equipoise, evidence is of approximate balance when the evidence in favor of and opposing the Veteran's claim is found to be almost exactly or nearly equal. Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc). Service connection for PTSD is denied. The Veteran contends that his acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is related to active service. Specifically, the Veteran asserts that he has PTSD due to an incident in service in 1972, where he reports that he was tasked with guard duty at Spandau Prison in Berlin, Germany. He explained that the guard tower is haunted and experienced "people talking, items moving, and seeing ghostly figures." See July 2019 VA 21-4138 Statement In Support of Claim. He reports this event has caused him to experience his current mental health symptoms to present. Again, in addition to the general service connection requirements stated above, establishing service connection for PTSD requires the following: (1) medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). In this case, the Veteran, in essence, is claiming he has PTSD related to the 1972 stressor. Notably, if the evidence establishes that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony ; and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). In this case, the Veteran, in essence, is claiming he has PTSD related to the 1972 stressor. Notably, if the evidence establishes that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2). If a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD and that the veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, affirmed that when a reported stressor is not related to either combat or the fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, then a Veteran's statements and testimony alone are not considered to be sufficient to establish the occurrence of a claimed in-service stressor. Hall v. Shinseki, 717 F.3d 1369 (2013). In this case, the evidence does not show that the Veteran engaged in combat, or that he was exposed to hostile military or terrorist activity; therefore, the presumptions afforded to Veterans who allege combat or fear of hostile military or terrorist activity are inapplicable in this case. Thus, any alleged in-service stressors reported by the Veteran must be independently verified, i.e., corroborated by objective, credible supporting evidence. First, the Board notes that service treatment records (STRs) are silent to a mental health symptoms or condition of any kind. The Veteran's entrance examination and separation examination both indicate no psychiatric issues. See STR - Medical. Second, VA treatment records from 2015 show that the Veteran denied any depression, anxiety, mood problem, PTSD, or history of psychiatric care. See January/February 2015 CAPRI Records. The records also show a negative PTSD screening in January 2015. Id. The first record of any mental health complaints is recorded in March 2019; the Veteran reported having a hard time sleeping and experiencing flashbacks and asked to see mental health. See March 2019 CAPRI Records. In May 2019, the Veteran was evaluated for PTSD and reported symptoms, including depressed mood, some paranoid feelings (apprehension), decreased sleep, spending time away from others, as if staring the sky, "constantly on guard", scanning the places trying to stay safe from others, and flashbacks from when he did guard duty to a single WWII prisoner with intrusive thoughts of the same topic. See May 2019 CAPRI Records. He was diagnosed with chronic PTSD following military combat and was prescribed medication. Id. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in January 2021. The examiner found that the Veteran's symptoms did not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under DSM-5 criteria. Rather, he was diagnosed with bereavement, noting that the Veteran reported increased depression with the death of his son and son's mother. Based upon a review of the record and the Veteran's reports, the examiner opined that he does not have PTSD. The examiner reasoned that there is no objective evidence that he experienced a stressor that fulfills Criterion A for PTSD. The VA mental health provider diagnosed combat related PTSD in 2019, but the records do not support that the Veteran was in combat. Additionally, military service records are silent for any mental health complaints or treatment. Post-service treatment records are silent for any mental health complaints until 2019; and VA records from February 2016 through February 2019 contain negative depression screens. As such, the examiner found that there was no objective evidence for chronic symptoms of depression, it is less likely as not that the Veteran has PTSD, and his current diagnosis of bereavement is not connected to his service. The Board finds the January 2021 VA opinion as to the Veteran's mental or that fulfills Criterion A for PTSD. The VA mental health provider diagnosed combat related PTSD in 2019, but the records do not support that the Veteran was in combat. Additionally, military service records are silent for any mental health complaints or treatment. Post-service treatment records are silent for any mental health complaints until 2019; and VA records from February 2016 through February 2019 contain negative depression screens. As such, the examiner found that there was no objective evidence for chronic symptoms of depression, it is less likely as not that the Veteran has PTSD, and his current diagnosis of bereavement is not connected to his service. The Board finds the January 2021 VA opinion as to the Veteran's mental health conditions to be the most probative evidence of record because it is provided after a review of the record on appeal and an examination of the Veteran as well as because it is supported by citation to evidence found in the record and controlling medical principles. Accordingly, the VA examiner's opinions are entitled to great probative weight. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 303-304 (2008). Tellingly, at this time, the findings of the January 2021 VA examination are not contradicted by any other medical evidence of record. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991) (VA may only consider independent medical evidence to support its findings and is not permitted to base decisions on its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions). Therefore, the Board finds that it is the most probative evidence of record. See Owens, supra. The Board has considered the lay statements provided by the Veteran's friend (P.B.), the Veteran's sister (C.S.), and the Veteran's friend/former significant other (S.M.). See November 2020 Buddy / Lay Statements. While their observations have been acknowledged, the Board notes that they are not competent to diagnose an acquired psychiatric disability or render an opinion as to the etiology of the Veteran's current disability. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Similarly, the Board has considered the Veteran's lay statements and testimony at the hearing. See July 2019 VA 21-4138 Statement In Support of Claim; November 2020 VA 21-4138 Statement In Support of Claim; January 2025 Hearing Transcript. The Veteran contends that his current acquired psychiatric disorder is related to his unreported stressor from service. However, while the Veteran is certainly competent to report as to the observable symptoms he experienced and their history, he is not competent to diagnose an acquired psychiatric disability during service or render an opinion as to the etiology of his current disability since service, because of the medically complex nature of such a diagnosis or opinion. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting general competence to testify as to symptoms but not to provide medical diagnosis). In this case, the Veteran's claimed stressor has not been corroborated. Additionally, the VA provider who diagnosed PTSD, based on the Veteran's subjective reports, indicated it was related to combat, which is not supported by the records. The STRs are silent for any mental health conditions, there are several negative depression and PTSD screenings from 2015 to 2019, and the first reports of mental health symptoms is 2019, more than 45 years after discharge from active service. Furthermore, the record contains no medical opinion which supports that the Veteran's current acquired psychiatric condition was caused by or related to his military service. This evidence cannot be ignored. Based on the foregoing, service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is not warranted in this case. In making this determination, the Board has weighed the STRs, the post-service medical evidence, including the VA medical opinions, against the other evidence of record, including the Veteran's treatment records and lay contentions. In this regard, the Board finds that the competent, credible and probative evidence of record does not establish that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder is etiologically related to service. Instead, the competent evidence of record shows the Veteran's diagnosed psychiatric disorder began after service and is unrelated to military service. Put simply, the claims file does not contain any competent evidence relating the Veteran's currently diagnosed psychiatric disorders to be ignored. Based on the foregoing, service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is not warranted in this case. In making this determination, the Board has weighed the STRs, the post-service medical evidence, including the VA medical opinions, against the other evidence of record, including the Veteran's treatment records and lay contentions. In this regard, the Board finds that the competent, credible and probative evidence of record does not establish that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder is etiologically related to service. Instead, the competent evidence of record shows the Veteran's diagnosed psychiatric disorder began after service and is unrelated to military service. Put simply, the claims file does not contain any competent evidence relating the Veteran's currently diagnosed psychiatric disorders to service. The Board acknowledges the assertions in the April 2025 claimant's brief that indicates that the certification was revoked for the C&P examiner in this case. However, the examination was conducted in January 2021 and the registration was changed to inactive on December 2, 2022. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the examiner was not certified at the time of the January 2021 examination or was otherwise unqualified at that time. See 4/21/2025, Correspondence; 1/20/2021 C&P Exam. In reaching the above conclusions the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as there is not an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the claim that doctrine is not applicable in this case. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc). S. Merrick Acting Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board M. Murphy The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.