DEPRESSION

JENNA BRANT · 2026 · Case ID: A26027246

DENIED

Summary

The Veteran, who served in the U.S. Army Reserve from October 2007 to March 2008, appeals the denial of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, specifically PTSD, anxiety, and depression. The Veteran claimed these conditions stemmed from his service as a military policeman and ordinance specialist, duties he described as highly stressful and exposing him to dangerous situations. He noted that not seeking treatment in service did not preclude a service connection. The Board reviewed the evidence, including a February 2013 VA treatment record showing a depression diagnosis and a November 2013 record noting anxiety complaints, though the latter was ruled out. However, the Board found the evidence persuasively against a service connection. The Veteran's service treatment records were silent regarding any psychiatric complaints or treatment. A post-service periodic health assessment indicated he denied psychiatric symptoms. The Board noted the significant time lapse between service and the first psychiatric diagnosis, citing Forshey v. Principi. While acknowledging the representative's assertion about MOS-related stress, the Board found it lacked specificity and probative value, as the representative is not competent to establish an etiological link. The Board also found no continuity of psychiatric symptomatology since service. For PTSD, the Board found no current diagnosis, citing Romanowsky v. Shinseki and McClain v. Nicholson, and noted the Veteran's failure to respond to a VA request for details about a claimed stressor. The Board concluded the evidence did not establish the in-service incurrence or a causal relationship to service. The claim was denied.

Rationale

No in-service complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for psychiatric disability.; Absence of psychiatric symptoms for several years after service.; No continuity of psychiatric symptomatology since service.; No current diagnosis of PTSD.; Failure to provide details for claimed PTSD stressor.

Service Branch

ARMY

Special Benefit

NO SPECIAL BENEFIT

Docket No.

210409-151508

Full Decision Text

Citation Nr: A26027246
Decision Date: 03/25/26 Archive Date: 03/25/26

DOCKET NO. 210409-151508
DATE: March 25, 2026

ORDER

Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety and depression, is denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The evidence of record is persuasively against a finding that the Veteran's current diagnosis of depression began during active service or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease.

2. The medical record includes no formal diagnosis of PTSD.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, anxiety, and depression, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304.

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION

The Veteran served on active-duty training (ACDUTRA) in the U.S. Army Reserve from October 2007 to March 2008. The Veteran also had additional periods of inactive duty for training (INACDUTRA) in the Reserves.

This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a February 2021 rating decision issued by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office, an agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ).

The Veteran submitted an April 2021 VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal, identifying the February 2021 rating decision. In the April 2021 VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal, the Veteran elected the Hearing docket. However, in October 2024, the Veteran and his representative withdrew the hearing request; therefore, the Board may only consider the evidence of record at the time of the February 2021 AOJ decision, as well as any evidence submitted by the Veteran or his representative within 90 days following receipt of the hearing withdrawal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b). The Board cannot consider (1) evidence submitted during the period after the RO issued the decision on appeal and before the withdrawal, or (2) evidence submitted more than 90 days after the withdrawal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.303.

If evidence was associated with the claims file during a period of time when additional evidence was not allowed, the Board has not considered it in its decision. 38 C.F.R. § 20.300. If the Veteran would like VA to consider any evidence that was added to the claims file that the Board could not consider, the Veteran may file a Supplemental Claim (VA Form 20-0995) and submit or identify this evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2501. If the evidence is new and relevant, VA will issue another decision on the claim, considering the new evidence in addition to the evidence previously considered. Id. Specific instructions for filing a Supplemental Claim are included with this decision.

Additionally, the PTSD, anxiety and depression claims have been recharacterized more broadly in light of Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 4-5 (2009) (a claim should not be limited to the disorder as characterized by the Veteran but must be characterized and addressed based on the reasonable expectations of the non-expert claimant and the evidence in processing the claim).

Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, anxiety, and depression is denied.

The Veteran contends that he has acquired psychiatric disabilities, specifically PTSD, anxiety and depression, which stem from service. See September 2020 VA 21-526EZ. The Veteran's representative explained that his military records show that he served as a military policeman and ordinance specialist and his duties in service would have been highly stressful and exposed him to dangerous and life-threatening situations on a regular basis, and the fact that he did not seek treatment in service does not mean that his condition did not exist. See January 2025 Third Party Correspondence.

Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a).

"Active military, naval, air, or space service" includes active duty, any period of ACDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled from a disease or injury incurred in the line of duty, and any period of INACDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled from an injury incurred in
and life-threatening situations on a regular basis, and the fact that he did not seek treatment in service does not mean that his condition did not exist. See January 2025 Third Party Correspondence.

Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a).

"Active military, naval, air, or space service" includes active duty, any period of ACDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled from a disease or injury incurred in the line of duty, and any period of INACDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled from an injury incurred in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 101(21), (24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a).

ACDUTRA is, among other things, full-time duty in the Armed Forces performed by Reserves for training purposes or by members of the National Guard of any state. 38 U.S.C. § 101(22); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(c)(1). INACDUTRA is part-time duty in the Armed Forces performed by Reserves for training purposes or by members of the National Guard of any state. 38 U.S.C. § 101(22); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(c)(1).

In order to establish service connection for a claimed disability on a direct basis, there must be competent evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Service connection for PTSD generally requires medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and a link-established by medical evidence-between the current symptoms and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1).

In making all determinations, the Board must fully consider the lay assertions of record. Lay testimony alone, however, is generally insufficient to establish the in-service stressor element of service connection for PTSD; instead, that lay evidence must be corroborated by "credible supporting evidence." See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1997).

There are, however, four regulatory exceptions where lay testimony alone can support the finding of an in-service stressor. These exceptions include when PTSD is diagnosed in service with a stressor related to that service; when a "combat veteran" under 38 U.S.C. § 1154 asserts a stressor related to combat; when the stressor is related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity; and when a prisoner-of-war (P.O.W.) under 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(y) asserts a stressor related to P.O.W. experience. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1)-(4).

If a stressor claimed by a Veteran is related to the Veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a qualified examiner confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and that the Veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service, then the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3).

When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter (which includes but is not limited to equipoise), VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776, 778 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

Medical records, including a February 2013 VA treatment record show the Veteran has been diagnosed as having depression. Therefore, a current psychiatric disability has been demonstrated and the first Shedden element has been met.

The Board concludes that, while the Veteran has current diagnoses of depression, the evidence of record persuasively weighs against finding that the Veteran's depression began during service or is otherwise related to
not limited to equipoise), VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776, 778 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

With respect to an in-service injury, event, or disease, the Board observes that the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs) are silent for any injury, complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for an acquired psychiatric disability. There is no separation examination report in the Veteran's file; however, a February 2009 (less than one year after separation from service) periodic health assessment indicates that the Veteran denied having any psychiatric symptoms.

The first clinical findings of an acquired psychiatric disability are not shown until February 2013, at which time the examiner noted a diagnosis of depression. The examiner also noted the Veteran's report that he has a lot of stress in his life from a previous divorce. He has crying spells at times, and he does not sleep well. He denied any suicidal ideations or thoughts of harming self. See February 2013 VA Treatment Record.

A November 2013 VA treatment record noted the Veteran complained of having anxiety. He explained that he is interested in obtaining mental health services for anxiety and issues related to his chronic pain. However, the examiner ruled out an anxiety diagnosis.

Although the Veteran was diagnosed with depression, the Veteran was not treated for a psychiatric disability for many years following his service and the absence of any evidence of psychiatric problems for several years after separating from active service is one factor weighing against his claim. See Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (the Board may consider in its assessment of a service connection claim the passage of a lengthy period of time wherein the veteran has not complained of the malady at issue).

The Board acknowledges the representative's assertion that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disability may be caused by duties associated with his military occupational specialty (MOS) as a military policeman and ordinance specialist because his MOS duties were highly stressful and exposed him to dangerous and life-threatening situations on a regular basis. See January 2025 Third Party Correspondence. However, the Veteran's representative did not identify any stressful duties or life-threatening situations specific to the Veteran, and she is not competent to provide an etiological link to service. The issue is medically complex, as it requires a specialized medical education. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the Veteran does not specifically contend, and the evidence does not otherwise reflect that he has experienced a continuity of psychiatric symptomatology in the years since service. As such, the Board assigns no probative weight to the representative's assertion.

Accordingly, the Board finds that the evidence of record does not establish the in-service incurrence element of this claim. Additionally, there is no evidence indicating that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disability is causally related to his service. Considering the pertinent evidence in light of the governing legal authority, the Board finds that the evidence is persuasively against the claim. The claim is denied.

With respect to PTSD, the Board concludes that the Veteran does not have a current diagnosis of PTSD per 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) and has not had one at any time during the pendency of the claim or recent to the filing of the claim. Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007).

Again, the Veteran's STRs do not contain any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis for PTSD. Also, a review of the Veteran's post service treatment records during the current review period are negative for a diagnosis for PTSD.

Additionally, the Veteran has not submitted any statements regarding why he believes he suffers from PTSD or described the history of any symptomatology he believes is related to his service. The AOJ issued the Veteran a subsequent development letter in December 2020 requesting that he provide specific details of
. Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007).

Additionally, the Veteran has not submitted any statements regarding why he believes he suffers from PTSD or described the history of any symptomatology he believes is related to his service. The AOJ issued the Veteran a subsequent development letter in December 2020 requesting that he provide specific details of the stressful incident in service that resulted in his PTSD. However, the Veteran did not respond.

While the Veteran believes he has a current diagnosis of PTSD, he is not competent to provide a diagnosis in this case. The issue is medically complex, as it requires specialized medical education, and the ability to conduct and interpret complicated diagnostic medical testing. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

In light of the above, the Board finds that the probative evidence of record does not demonstrate that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD, and it finds that the first element of service connection has not been met for this claim. In the absence of evidence of a current disability, there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223.225 (1992).

The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (1997). The evidence must show that the Veteran currently has the disability for which benefits are being claimed. As such, the Veteran cannot establish service connection for PTSD.

At this juncture, the Board acknowledges the representative's assertion that the Veteran's claim was denied without providing him with a VA medical examination, which is a violation of the VA's duty to assist.

Pursuant to McLendon v. Nicholson, a VA examination must be provided when there is: (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, (2) evidence establishing an event, injury or disease occurred in-service, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or current symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) there is insufficient competent evidence of record to make a decision on the claim. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 82 (2006); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4).

In this instance, there is an absence of evidence prior to the decision on appeal indicating that his acquired psychiatric disability may be associated with his service as the Veteran has not asserted a specific theory of entitlement for his claim. See September 2020 VA Form 21-526EZ; see also April 2021 VA Form 10182. Again, the Board acknowledges the representative's assertions that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disability may be caused by duties associated with his MOS. However, merely making a claim is insufficient to indicate a current disability or nexus to service. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d, 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010). (distinguishing cases where only a conclusory generalized statement is provided by the veteran and rejecting the theory that medical examinations are to be routinely and virtually automatically provided to all veterans in disability cases involving nexus issues). Further, prior to the rating decision on appeal, he had not provided any argument in support of this claim, including identifying any event, injury, or disease in service to which his claimed disability may be related. Therefore, the AOJ did not commit a pre-decisional duty to assist error by not obtaining a VA examination and under the modernized review system, the Board may not remand for a VA examination based on post decisional evidence such as the assertions from the representative in the third-party correspondence. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 83-86 (2006). As such, VA's duty to assist in providing an examination has not been triggered.

The Board also acknowledges the representative's request, which appears to indicate a request for remand to conduct further development of the Veteran's claim. See January 2025 Third Party Correspondence. However, the Board's ability to remand under the AMA is limited to correction of a pre-decisional duty to assist error and "for correction of any other error by the AOJ in satisfying a regulatory or statutory duty, if correction of the error would have a reasonable possibility of aiding in substantiating the appellant's claim." 38 C.F.R. § 20.802. Here, as noted by the AOJ in the February 2021 rating decision, VA advised the Veteran of the evidence needed to support his claim and requested he provide details of his stressful event in service in September and December 2020, but the Veteran did not respond. Consequently, the AOJ was not obligated pursuant to its duty to assist to take further action in this regard. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991) ("The duty to assist is not always a one-way street"). Moreover, under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a), a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for VA benefits. See Skoczen v. Shinseki, 564 F.3d 1319, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the "support" requirement of section 5107(a) obligates the claimant to provide some evidentiary basis for his or her benefits claim). Accordingly, the Board finds that remand for additional development is not appropriate, and the Board must decide this issue based on the evidence of record.

There appears to be no competent suggestion that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disability is related to service in any way, or that it was incurred therein. While the Veteran may believe that his acquired psychiatric disability is related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, he is not competent to provide a nexus opinion in this case. The issue is medically complex, as it requires specialized medical education, and the ability to conduct and interpret complicated diagnostic medical testing. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, the weight of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran has a PTSD diagnosis and his acquired psychiatric disability, to include depression, is related to his period of service. The claim is denied.

In reaching the above decision, the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt; however, as the evidence persuasively weighs against the Veteran's claim, the doctrine does not apply. Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021), 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 4.3.

Jenna Brant

Veterans Law Judge

Board of Veterans' Appeals

Attorney for the Board Miller, D. M. Associate Counsel

The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.

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