POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)

Summary

The veteran served in the U.S. Army from April 1972 to January 1975. He appeals the denial of service connection for diabetes mellitus type II (DMII), hypertension, prostate cancer, sleep apnea, impotence, peripheral neuropathy, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease. The veteran claims DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea are related to alleged herbicide exposure in Korea, and that his peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication are secondary to DMII. The Board found the veteran's lay statements regarding his presence in the Korean DMZ and exposure to herbicides to be competent and credible, but noted that his service occurred after the recognized period of herbicide application in the DMZ and that he lacked the expertise to identify chemical compounds. The Board also found the evidence weighed against a direct service connection for these conditions and that his secondary claims failed because DMII was not service-connected. The Board remanded the claims for service connection for PTSD and depression, noting that while previously denied, new evidence of diagnoses had been submitted, and the AOJ failed to obtain an etiological opinion for the veteran's mental health conditions, which included AWOL incidents and lay testimony about his mental state during service. The Board denied the other claims based on the preponderance of the evidence.

Rationale

New evidence of PTSD diagnosis submitted; AOJ failed to obtain etiological opinion; Remand for VA opinion on nexus to service

Full Decision Text

Citation Nr: A25096569
Decision Date: 11/06/25	Archive Date: 11/06/25

DOCKET NO. 240401-430020
DATE: November 6, 2025

ORDER

Readjudication of the claim for service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is warranted.

Readjudication of the claim for service connection for depression is warranted.

Service connection for diabetes mellitus type II (DMII) is denied.

Service connection for hypertension is denied.

Service connection for prostate cancer is denied.

Service connection for sleep apnea is denied.

Service connection for impotence, to include as secondary to DMII, is denied.

Service connection for peripheral neuropathy, to include as secondary to DMII, is denied.

Service connection for bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease, to include as secondary to DMII, is denied.

REMANDED

The claim for service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is remanded.

The claim for service connection for depression, also claimed as anxiety, is remanded.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. By a final April 2014 rating decision, the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD was denied.  Evidence received since then tends to prove or disprove the matter at issue for service connection.

2. By a final April 2018 rating decision, the Veteran's claim for service connection for depression was denied.  Evidence received since then tends to prove or disprove the matter at issue for service connection. 

3. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran served in or near the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Korea during his period of service from September 1972 to October 1973 or was otherwise exposed to herbicide during his period of service.

4. The evidence indicates DMII was not present during the Veteran's service and did not develop or worsen as a result of any incident during service, including as due to herbicide agent exposure.

5. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's DMII was a chronic condition manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

6. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's hypertension was a chronic condition manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

7. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's prostate cancer was a chronic condition manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

8. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's sleep apnea was a chronic condition manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

9. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's impotence was a chronic condition secondary to a service-connected disability, had manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

10. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's peripheral neuropathy was a chronic condition secondary to a service-connected disability, had manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

11. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease was a chronic condition secondary to a service-connected disability, had manifested to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty, that there was a continuity of symptomatology, or that it was otherwise incurred or related to service.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The criteria for readjudication of service connection for PTSD have been met.  38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (d).

2. The criteria for readjudication of service connection for depression have been met.  38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (d).

3. The criteria for service connection for DMII have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307,
 incurred or related to service.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The criteria for readjudication of service connection for PTSD have been met.  38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (d).

2. The criteria for readjudication of service connection for depression have been met.  38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (d).

3. The criteria for service connection for DMII have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309.

4. The criteria for service connection for hypertension have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309.

5. The criteria for service connection for prostate cancer have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309.

6. The criteria for service connection for sleep apnea have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309.

7. The criteria for service connection for impotence, to include as secondary to DMII, have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310.

8. The criteria for service connection for peripheral neuropathy, to include as secondary to DMII, have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310.

9. The criteria for service connection for bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease, to include as secondary to DMII, have not been met.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310.

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from April 1972 to January 1975.

The appeal of service connection for DMII, sleep apnea, hypertension, impotence, peripheral neuropathy, and for bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease stems from a rating decision was issued in January 2023 and constitutes an initial decision; therefore, the modernized review system, also known as the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA), applies.

In January 2023, the Veteran submitted a VA Form 20-0995, Decision Review Request: Supplemental Claim, and requested readjudication of this issue most.  Later that month, the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) issued the supplemental claim decision on appeal, denied the claim on the evidence of record at the time of that decision.  While the question of whether new and relevant evidence was submitted for readjudication was not explicitly addressed, it appears that the April 2023 rating decision on the supplemental claim readjudicated the Veteran's appeal.  Therefore, the Board will assume that there was a favorable finding that new and relevant evidence was submitted and will be bound by this determination.

The Veteran submitted a new Supplemental Claim for these issues in September 2023.  Again, the question of whether new and relevant evidence was submitted for readjudication was not explicitly addressed but the October 2023 rating decision on the supplemental claim readjudicated issues and were ultimately denied.  Therefore, the Board will again assume that there was a favorable finding that new and relevant evidence was submitted and will be bound by this determination. 

Additionally, the issues of service connection for PTSD and depression were initially in an April 2014 rating decision under the legacy appeal system.  The Veteran submitted a timely Notice of Disagreement.  Following the issuance of the January 2016 Statement of the Case, the Veteran submitted an untimely VA Form 9, substantive appeal, in November 2016.  Therefore, the April 2014 rating decision became final. 

In September 2023, the Veteran submitted a VA Form 20-0995
 decision on the supplemental claim readjudicated issues and were ultimately denied.  Therefore, the Board will again assume that there was a favorable finding that new and relevant evidence was submitted and will be bound by this determination. 

Additionally, the issues of service connection for PTSD and depression were initially in an April 2014 rating decision under the legacy appeal system.  The Veteran submitted a timely Notice of Disagreement.  Following the issuance of the January 2016 Statement of the Case, the Veteran submitted an untimely VA Form 9, substantive appeal, in November 2016.  Therefore, the April 2014 rating decision became final. 

In September 2023, the Veteran submitted a VA Form 20-0995 Supplemental Claim Application for the issues of service connection for PTSD and depression.  The October 2023 rating decision was issued later that month denying the Veteran's claim as no new and relevant evidence had been submitted.

Finally, in April 2023, the Veteran submitted a claim of service connection for prostate cancer due to Agent Orange exposure in Korea.  The May 2023 rating decision denied the claim.

In the VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal, received by the Board in April 2024, the Veteran elected the Evidence Submission docket for all the issues on appeal.  Therefore, the Board may only consider the evidence of record at the time of the supplemental claim decision on appeal, as well as any evidence submitted by the Veteran or his representative with, or within 90 days from receipt of, the VA Form 10182.  38 C.F.R. § 20.303.

Claims for Adjudication

The Veteran seeks to readjudicate his previously denied claim for service connection for a PTSD and depression.

VA will readjudicate a claim if new and relevant evidence is presented or secured. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (d).  In this regard, "new evidence" is existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers, while "relevant evidence" is evidence that tends to prove or disprove the matter at issue.  38 C.F.R. § 3.2501 (a)(1).  For VA to readjudicate the claim, the evidentiary record must include new and relevant evidence that was not of record as of the date of notice of the prior decision.  38 C.F.R. § 3.2501 (b).

The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) create a low threshold for the reopening of claims.  The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) noted that the regulation is designed to be consistent with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4), which does not require new and relevant evidence as to each previously unproven element of a claim.  Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010).  For establishing whether new and relevant evidence has been submitted, the credibility of the evidence is presumed.  Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992).

The issues were previously denied in the April 2014 rating decision as the evidence of record did not reflect a current diagnosis of PTSD and depression.  However, evidence received since the April 2014 rating decision reflects that diagnoses of these disabilities have been made.  Therefore, readjudication of service connection of connection for PTSD and depression is therefore warranted.  Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2011) (addressing the nature of the new and material evidence standard; the new and relevant standard has an even lower evidentiary burden).

Service Connection

Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service.  38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303.

Service connection requires competent evidence showing: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.  Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Service connection may also be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b), where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic, or where a diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned.  The continuity of symptomatology provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b) has been interpreted as an alternative to service connection only for the specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F
 of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.  Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Service connection may also be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b), where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic, or where a diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned.  The continuity of symptomatology provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b) has been interpreted as an alternative to service connection only for the specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a).  See Walker v. Shinseki, 718 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Service connection may also be established with certain chronic diseases based upon a legal presumption by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent disabling or more within one year from the date of separation from service. Such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service.  38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a).  While the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumption period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time.

The Veteran seeks service connection for DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea.  Specifically, the Veteran contends that he was exposed to Agent Orange while stationed at the Korean DMZ during his military service.  He stated this exposure subsequently led to the diagnosis of his disabilities.  The Veteran further claims that his peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication with superficial femoral artery is secondary to his DMII. 

A veteran can establish herbicide agent exposure presumptively if, between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971, the Veteran served in a unit that operated in or near the Korean DMZ in an area in which herbicides are known to have been applied during that period.  38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iv).

If a veteran is not presumed to have been exposed to herbicide agents, the veteran may still establish service connection for a disability or disease as due to herbicide exposure with proof of direct causation, or on any other recognized basis.  See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120 (2007).

The question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, to include exposure to herbicide agents during service in Korea from September 1972 to October 1973. 

As an initial matter, the Board notes that the Veteran does not allege, nor does the record reflect, that he first manifested DMII, hypertension, and prostate cancer, and sleep apnea during service, or within one year of his discharge from service. Rather, the Veteran has only claimed that his DMII, hypertension, and prostate cancer, and sleep apnea is related to his alleged exposure to herbicide agents during service.  See Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1361 (2008) (claims which have no support in the record need not be considered by the Board as the Board is not obligated to consider "all possible" substantive theories of recovery.  Where a fully developed record is presented to the Board with no evidentiary support for a particular theory of recovery, there is no reason for the Board to address or consider such a theory).

A current diagnosis DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea are confirmed by the evidence of record.  Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the Veteran was exposed to herbicide agents, including Agent Orange, such that his disabilities may be presumed to be related to that exposure.

The Board concludes that, while the Veteran has been diagnosed with DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea the evidence of record persuasively weighs against finding that it began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease.  

As stated previously, VA recognizes that herbicide agents were used along the DMZ in Korea and exposure to herbicides will be conceded, but only if a
 a theory).

A current diagnosis DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea are confirmed by the evidence of record.  Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the Veteran was exposed to herbicide agents, including Agent Orange, such that his disabilities may be presumed to be related to that exposure.

The Board concludes that, while the Veteran has been diagnosed with DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea the evidence of record persuasively weighs against finding that it began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease.  

As stated previously, VA recognizes that herbicide agents were used along the DMZ in Korea and exposure to herbicides will be conceded, but only if a veteran was assigned to a specified unit between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971.  Here, the Veteran's military personnel records confirm that he served in the Republic of Korea from September 1972 to October 1973, after the last date as of which herbicide use in the DMZ is recognized.  As the Veteran's service in Korea was after August 31, 1971, in-service exposure to herbicides cannot be presumed. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iv).

However, the availability of presumptive service connection for a disability based on exposure to herbicides does not preclude a Veteran from alternatively establishing that he was in fact exposed to herbicides, including Agent Orange.

In this regard, the Veteran has submitted lay statements in support of his contentions that he served in the Korean DMZ and was exposed to herbicides.  In a statement received by the VA in January 2023, the Veteran stated he was on guard duty near a nuclear missile base in South Korea.

The Board finds the Veteran's reports that his duties brought him to the Korean DMZ are both competent and credible.  The Veteran's recollection of the events has remained consistent, and his statements are consistent with the nature and circumstances of his service.  See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Miller v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 249 (2020).

However, mere service at or near the DMZ does not in itself equal exposure to herbicides.  To the extent that the Veteran believes that he was exposed to herbicide agents during service, there is no indication in the record that the Veteran possesses the necessary expertise to identify chemical compounds, such that his observations would be sufficient to establish the presence of herbicide agents.  See Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36, 40 (2010) (holding that it was not error for the Board to reject a veteran's lay testimony regarding in-service exposure to gases or chemicals on the basis that such exposure was not documented in his personnel records).  Therefore, his assertions do not show actual herbicide exposure, or show that his service in Korea was during the presumptive period.

In this regard, the Board points to the established fact that herbicide use near the Korean DMZ ended in 1969, several years before Veteran's period of Korean service began.  See McKinney v. McDonald, 796 F.3d, 1377, 1379 (Fed Cir. 2015). Under § 3.307(a)(6)(iv), the initial period during which service in or near the Korean DMZ would justify a presumption of herbicide exposure was initially set from April 1968 to July 1969.  See McKinney, 796 F.3d at 1380.  In the final rule, however, VA extended the period end date from July 31, 1969, to August 31, 1971.  Herbicide Exposure and Veterans with Covered Service in Korea, 76 Fed. Reg. 4245, 4245-46 (Jan. 25, 2011).  "In adopting this change, the VA explained that 'it is reasonable and consistent with the intent of Congress to concede exposure for veterans who served in or near the Korean DMZ after herbicide application ceased, because of the potential for exposure to residuals of herbicides applied in that area.'"  McKinney, 796 F.3d at 1380 (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 4245).  Thus, August 31, 1971, was established "as a reasonable outside date for residual exposure."  Id.

While the Veteran believes his disabilities are related to Agent Orange exposure, the Board reiterates that the evidence of record persuasively weighs against findings that exposure
 25, 2011).  "In adopting this change, the VA explained that 'it is reasonable and consistent with the intent of Congress to concede exposure for veterans who served in or near the Korean DMZ after herbicide application ceased, because of the potential for exposure to residuals of herbicides applied in that area.'"  McKinney, 796 F.3d at 1380 (quoting 76 Fed. Reg. at 4245).  Thus, August 31, 1971, was established "as a reasonable outside date for residual exposure."  Id.

While the Veteran believes his disabilities are related to Agent Orange exposure, the Board reiterates that the evidence of record persuasively weighs against findings that exposure to Agent Orange occurred.  The Veteran is not shown that he is competent to identify Agent Orange or other herbicide agents, nor is he shown to have any expertise in toxicology.  See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

There is also no evidence that it is directly related to his military service.  The Veteran's service treatment records are absent of any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea.  Again, the post-service treatment records revealed the Veteran has been diagnosed and treated for DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea.  However, there is no evidence supporting the etiological relationship between these disabilities and his military service.  The conditions were diagnosed decades after the Veteran's military service and, as such, absent a presumptive link, there is no basis upon which to find that the disabilities were the result of the Veteran's military service.

In light of the above, the Board finds that the evidence is persuasively against a finding that the Veteran was exposed to herbicides in service.  Further, there is no indication that the Veteran's claimed DMII, hypertension, prostate cancer, and sleep apnea are otherwise related to service.  Accordingly, the claim must be denied.  As there is not an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable, and service connection is not warranted.  See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.

The Veteran's claims of service connection for peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease likewise fail, as the Veteran has asserted that they were all secondary to his DMII, which is not service connected.

A disability which is proximately due to, or the result of, a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected.  38 C.F.R. § 3.310.  Additionally, when aggravation of a Veteran's nonservice-connected condition is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected condition, the Veteran shall be compensated for the degree of disability over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation.  Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995).

At the outset, the Board acknowledges that the medical evidence of record indicates that the Veteran's hypertension, erectile dysfunction, and peripheral vascular disease are secondary to his DMII.  Specifically, the April 2023 VA diabetes mellitus examination report reflects this determination.  The February 2023 VA diabetic sensory-motor peripheral neuropathy VA examination report supports the findings of current upper and lower extremity diabetic peripheral neuropathy.  However, as adjudicated above, DMII has not been service-connected.  As the underlying disorder is not service-connected, secondary service connection is without legal merit and must be denied due to the lack of entitlement under the law.  See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994).  Therefore, the Board concludes that service connection on a secondary basis is not warranted.

There is also no evidence that these disabilities are directly related to his military service.  That is, the objective evidence of record does not show that these disabilities were diagnosed in service or within a year of service and the weight of the evidence is against a finding that they have existed continuously since service.

The only evidence of record in support of the Veteran claim consists of his own lay statements.  The Veteran is considered competent to report the observable manifestations of his claimed disabilities.  See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994).  However, the Veteran is not competent (meaning medically trained) to opine on the diagnosis or etiology of his peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease.  Where a determinative issue involves medical causation or a
 does not show that these disabilities were diagnosed in service or within a year of service and the weight of the evidence is against a finding that they have existed continuously since service.

The only evidence of record in support of the Veteran claim consists of his own lay statements.  The Veteran is considered competent to report the observable manifestations of his claimed disabilities.  See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994).  However, the Veteran is not competent (meaning medically trained) to opine on the diagnosis or etiology of his peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease.  Where a determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence is required.  See Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993).  In this case, the etiology of these disabilities is a complex medical question that is not within the competence of a layperson.  See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011).

While the Veteran believes his peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease are the result of his military service, the contemporaneous evidence does not support such a conclusion.  Here, the complaints of his peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease were not shown by the service treatment records.  

Therefore, the criteria of service connection for peripheral neuropathy, impotence, and bilateral claudication/superficial femoral artery disease, to include as secondary to DMII, have not been met and the Veteran's claims are denied.

REASONS FOR REMAND

The Veteran contends that his PTSD and depression are the result of his military service. 

The record reflects that the Veteran was reprimanded for going AWOL on several occasions during military service for reasons of his poor mental health.  In August 1975, the Veteran; his mother, O.L.C.; and his partner, D.D. testified that the Veteran would come to their home while on AWOL and exhibited signs of depression such as "He would be by himself, lay around and cry, and he was suffering with his stomach."  They were told by a doctor that the Veteran needed to seek treatment from a psychiatrist. 

According to an October 1975 Administrative Decision, it was determined that the Veteran's discharge in January 1975 was under dishonorable conditions as are result of his "AWOL on three occasions totally 256 days.  [The Veteran] punishment by summary court martial authority for his first period of AWOL (24 days)."  It was noted that the Veteran's mother and partner testified supporting the contention that he was "insane at the time of committing the offenses which resulted in his discharge..."  Furthermore, the decision acknowledged that "The evidence indicates that the [Veteran] was confused and perhaps greatly troubled on the occasions that he decided to go AWOL, but not that he was unaware of the consequences of such action." 

In February 2013, the Veteran's character of discharge was upgraded from "other than honorable" to "under honorable conditions."   

In August 2015, the Veteran was afforded a VA PTSD examination.  A diagnosis of PTSD was confirmed.  However, an etiological opinion was not provided.  The VA treatment records, dated December 2015, also reflect that the Veteran was diagnosed with PTSD and depression.  The post-treatment records also do not include an etiological opinion.

Given the Veteran's history of claimed mental health difficulties during service, the incidents of going AWOL, and the testimonies of his mother and his partner, the Board finds the AOJ failed to obtain an etiological opinion.  Therefore, as this constitutes a pre-decisional duty to assist error, a remand for a VA opinion is warranted. 

The matters are REMANDED for the following action:

Obtain an addendum opinion regarding the etiology of the Veteran's PTSD and depression.  If a physical examination is necessary to answer the Board's questions, one should be scheduled. 

The VA examiner is asked the following:

a.)	Is it at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater) that the Veteran's PTSD either began during or was otherwise caused by his military service.  Why or why not?  

b.)	Is it at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater) that the Veteran's depression either began during or was otherwise caused by his military service.  Why or why not?  

The VA examiner is asked to consider and address in the rationale the Veteran's lay statements regarding the onset and his symptomatology of his PTSD and depression, the July 1975 Board hearing testimonies regarding the Veteran